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AbSTRACT
As the first human rights treaty of the twenty-first century, the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) protects some 
650 million persons with disabilities. The CRPD also has an opportunity 
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to progressively reconfigure the structure and process of human rights 
oversight. While the overall framework for monitoring and implementing 
the CRPD resembles existing core human rights instruments, it has some 
notable features. The CPRD Committee is endowed with several innovations 
of significant potential, especially in the breadth of reporting and investiga-
tive procedures, thereby offering prospects for other treaty bodies and the 
human rights system more generally. Accordingly, this article examines 
the development of the CRPD Committee and assesses its potential for 
invigorating future United Nations monitoring reforms. 
I. INTRODUCTION
As the first human rights treaty of the twenty-first century, the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD or Convention)1 
has an opportunity to progressively reconfigure the structure and process 
of human rights oversight.2 The Convention was opened for signature on 
30 March 2007, and entered into force on 3 May 2008.3 On 3 November 
2008, a monitoring Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(Committee) was elected during the initial Conference of States Parties4 to 
protect the rights of the world’s largest minority, some 650 million persons 
with disabilities.5 
The overall framework for monitoring and implementing the Convention 
resembles existing core human rights instruments, particularly the Interna-
tional Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappear-
ance that was adopted eight days after the adoption of the CRPD.6 At the 
same time, the Committee is endowed with several notable innovations of 
significant potential, especially in the breadth of reporting and investigative 
 1. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, adopted 13 Dec. 2006, G.A. Res. 
61/106, U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/106 (2006) (entered into force 3 
May 2008) [hereinafter CRPD]. The CRPD text, along with its drafting history, resolutions, 
and updated list of signatories and states parties is posted on the United Nations Enable 
website, available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/convtexte.htm.
 2. See id. The Convention was adopted by consensus by the General Assembly on 13 Dec. 
2006, together with its Optional Protocol. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, adopted 13 Dec. 2006, G.A. Res.61/10, U.N. GAOR, 
61st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/106 (2006) (entered into force 3 May 2008) [hereinafter 
CRPD Optional Protocol]. 
 3. Notably, the CRPD received the most signatures on its initial day, is the second fastest 
ratified human rights treaty, and the fastest negotiated human rights treaty. See UN En-
able, Factsheet on Persons with Disabilities [hereinafter UN Enable] available at http://
www.un.org/disabilities/default.asp?navid=13&pid=150. 
 4. See CRPD, supra note 1, art. 34. 
 5 See UN Enable, supra note 3.
 6. See International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappear-
ance, adopted 20 Dec. 2006, G.A. Res. 61/177, U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/
RES/61/177 (2007) [hereinafter Enforced Disappearances Convention]. 
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procedures, thereby offering prospects for other treaty bodies and the human 
rights system more generally.7 Accordingly, this article examines the devel-
opment of the CRPD Committee and assesses its potential for invigorating 
future United Nations monitoring reforms.
Part I of the article describes the Committee established by the United 
Nations to scrutinize the CRPD and highlights the Committee’s advances 
over other human rights treaty bodies. Next, Part II looks at monitoring in-
novations that were suggested during the CRPD negotiations at a time when 
treaty body reform was a major subtext, but were not ultimately incorpo-
rated into the final instrument. In so doing, Part II considers how adoption 
of some of these oversight procedures could have affected broader human 
rights treaty reform efforts at the United Nations. Finally, Part III suggests 
creative avenues through which the Committee may yet progressively shape 
the direction of human rights treaty monitoring. 
II. THE CRPD COMMITTEE 
A. background to Proposals 
During negotiation sessions leading to adoption of the CRPD, a number of 
monitoring and implementation proposals were submitted to the Ad Hoc 
Committee responsible for negotiating the draft treaty.8 Consequently, the 
CRPD travaux préparatoires disclose a relatively wide range of viewpoints by 
states, Disabled Persons Organizations (DPOs), nongovernmental organiza-
 7. For an exhaustive account of the Committee’s processes, see Janet E. Lord & Michael 
Ashley Stein, The Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, in The UniTed 
naTions and hUman RighTs: a CRiTiCal appRaisal (Philip Alston & Frédéric Mégret eds.)
(forthcoming 2010).
 8. See, e.g., Proposal on Monitoring Comprehensive and Integral International Convention on 
the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, Asia 
Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Institutions, 6th Sess., Ad Hoc Comm. (2005) 
[hereinafter Asia Pacific Proposal] available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/
documents/ahc6nhrida25.doc; Comprehensive and Integral International Convention to 
Promote and Protect the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, Working Paper 
by Mexico, U.N. GAOR, Ad Hoc Comm., 1st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/AC.265/WP.1 (2002) 
[hereinafter Mexico Proposal] available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/
adhocmeetaac265w1e.htm; see also Janet Lord & Kathy Guernsey, Monitoring Sympo-
sium: A Contribution to the Formulation of Proposals for Monitoring a United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities Report, U.S. National Council on 
Disability, American University, School of International Service & Mental Disability 
Rights International (24 Oct. 2005) [hereinafter Monitoring Symposium Report](on file 
with authors); Katherine Guernsey, Janet Lord & Kirsten Young, Ideas Memorandum on 
Implementation in Relation to a Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(Landmine Survivors Network, July, 2004)[hereinafter Ideas Memorandum](on file with 
authors).
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tions (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and National Human 
Rights Institutions (NHRIs) on how an effective monitoring and implementa-
tion system could be developed for the Convention.9 
The genesis of these innovative monitoring mechanisms was the general 
atmosphere of reform underway at the United Nations and a desire to re-
spond to critiques of the current system of human rights treaty monitoring.10 
Central among those concerns were overlapping and burdensome report-
ing obligations, backlogs in consideration of reports by treaty bodies, late 
submissions by states parties, and resource limitations.11 As a result, many 
 9. The CRPD travaux préparatoires may be found on the United Nations Enable website, 
available at http://www.un.org/disabilities/index.asp. In addition, several early proposals 
were put forward on monitoring prior to the convening of the 2004 Working Group. 
The Bangkok draft resulted from two regional workshops in Bangkok, Thailand in June 
and October of 2003 and was a comprehensive proposal insofar as it called for national 
level monitoring in addition to a treaty body with competence to receive reports, com-
munications, and conduct inquiries, among other things. See Bangkok Draft: Proposed 
Elements of a Comprehensive and Integral International Convention to Promote and 
Protect the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, (2003), available at http://www.un.org/esa/
socdev/enable/rights/bangkokdraft.htm [hereinafter Bangkok Proposal]. The Chair’s text 
presented before the convening of the Working Group offered two alternative models 
for implementation mechanisms, one proposing the establishment of (or use of existing) 
national human rights institutions to monitor Convention obligations, the establishment 
of a UN Disability Ombudsman, and reporting on disability issues to existing treaty 
bodies, and the other model mirroring existing treaty mechanisms by proposing the 
creation of a new treaty body which would monitor reports and receive communications 
and undertake inquiries. See Chair’s Draft Elements of a Comprehensive and Integral 
International Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of 
Persons with Disabilities, Draft Elements on Implementation: Application, Implementa-
tion and Monitoring of the Convention, 24 Dec. 2003, available at http://www.un.org/
esa/socdev/enable/rights/wgcontrib-chair2.htm [hereinafter Chair’s Proposal]. Venezuela 
submitted an early proposal within the framework of its draft convention text based on 
the Mexico proposal, with some amendments. See Draft submitted by the Government 
of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the Secretary of the Ad Hoc Committee on a 
Comprehensive and Integral International Convention on the Protection and Promotion 
of the Rights and Disabilities, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/AC.265/2003/WP.1 (18 June 
2003), available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/a_ac265_2003_wp1.htm 
[hereinafter Venezuela Proposal].
10. See generally The FUTURe oF Un hUman RighTs TReaTy moniToRing (Philip Alston & James 
Crawford eds., 2000) [hereinafter FUTURe oF Un]. Note that the first major discussion of 
reforming the human rights treaty body system occurred in 1989, with the release by 
the UN of a report on the subject by independent expert Philip Alston. See Effective 
Implementation of International Instruments on Human Rights, Including Reporting Obli-
gations Under International Instruments on Human Rights, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., U.N. 
Doc. A/44/688 (1989) [hereinafter UN Initial Report]. A comprehensive bibliography of 
the voluminous literature on treaty body reform is set forth in a background paper to a 
major meeting on the topic. See Expert Workshop on Reform of United Nations Human 
Rights Treaty Monitoring Bodies, University of Nottingham Human Rights Law Centre 
Annex I (2006), available at http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/shared/shared_hrlcprojects/
Projects_Current_Projects_Nottingham_TB_Workshop_Report.pdf [hereinafter Notting-
ham Report]. 
11. As one commentator archly (but accurately) put it, the current system of monitoring 
processes “constitute some of the most powerless, under-funded, toothless, formulaic,
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CRPD drafters thought it would behoove a new treaty monitoring body to 
act as a test laboratory for intrepid processes.12 
The Committee’s origin thus reflects the struggle to establish an effective 
monitoring mechanism that avoided pitfalls of the current system. This tension 
served to delay negotiations on monitoring until the Ad Hoc Committee’s 
penultimate session;13 in turn, the constricted time allotted to discussions en-
couraged a conservative result.14 Hence, although a number of the suggested 
   and politically manipulated institutions of the United Nations.” peTeR Uvin, hUman RighTs 
and developmenT 140 (2004). See also Claire O’Brien & Michael O’Flaherty, Reform of 
UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring Bodies: A Critique of the Concept Paper on the 
High Commissioner’s Proposal for a Unified Standing Treaty Body, 7 hUm. RTs. l. Rev. 
141, 144 (2007) (“To secure more than incremental improvements, it has been widely 
argued that the United Nations must radically redesign its treaty monitoring system. In 
particular, consolidation of the existing bodies, or at least of certain elements of their 
activities, has been urged.”).
12. Two papers by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR) provide an overview of treaty body reform and its implications for the 
CRPD. See Monitoring Implementation of the International Human Rights Instruments: 
An Overview of the Current Treaty Body System, U.N. OHCHR, Ad Hoc Comm. on 
a Comprehensive & Integral Int’l Convention on Protection & Promotion of the Rts. & 
Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, 5th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/AC.265/2005/CRP.2 (2005) 
[hereinafter OHCHR Monitoring Overview] available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/
enable/rights/ahc5documents.htm; Expert Paper on Existing Monitoring Mechanisms, 
Possible Relevant Improvements and Possible Innovations in Monitoring Mechanisms, 
U.N. OHCHR, Ad Hoc Comm. on a Comprehensive & Integral Int’l Convention on 
Protection & Promotion of the Rts. & Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, 7th Sess., 
U.N. Doc. A/AC.265/2006/CRP.4 (2006) [hereinafter OHCHR Expert Paper] available 
at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahc7docs/ahc7unedchrmonitor.doc. 
13. States caused additional delay by suggesting that any discussion of international-level 
monitoring would be premature until further progress was made on the outcome of 
treaty body reform. For an excellent discussion of the CRPD negotiations on monitor-
ing, see Gerard Quinn, Resisting the ‘Temptation of Elegance’: Can the Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Socialise States in Rights Behaviour?, in The Un 
ConvenTion on The RighTs oF peRsons wiTh disabiliTies: eURopean and sCandinavian peRspeCTives 
215, 224–229 (Oddný Mjöll Arnardóttir & Gerard Quinn eds., 2009).The Working Group 
text, which laid the textual foundation of the CRPD, reflects this situation insofar as it 
includes a provision on national level monitoring, but only a footnote regarding interna-
tional level monitoring. Draft Art. 25, Monitoring: National Implementation Framework 
Report,U.N. OHCHR, Ad Hoc Comm. on a Comprehensive & Integral Int’l Convention 
on the Protection & Promotion of the Rts. & Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, U.N. 
Doc. A/AC.265/2004/WG/CRP.4/Add.1, Add.2, Add.4, Add.5 (2004) [hereinafter Working 
Group Draft] available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahcwgreporta25.
htm. Footnote 112 to the Working Group text reads as follows and is appended to the 
single provision on national level monitoring in the foundational CRPD text: 
The Working Group did not have time to consider the issue of international monitoring of the 
draft Convention. Some members of the Working Group indicated, however, that international 
monitoring was an issue of considerable importance to them. Other members, however, had 
reservations in this respect. 
14. The negotiation of the text on monitoring was essentially left to the Eighth and final 
negotiating session of the Ad Hoc Committee, with much work done intercessionally in 
the weeks leading up to that session, but no draft language existing as late as the Seventh. 
See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Comprehensive and Integral International 
Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity
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reforms would have caused the Committee to diverge significantly from those 
of existing core treaties,15 the final form taken by the Convention’s monitoring 
system resembles existing treaty bodies16 with some significant innovations 
culled from the tabled proposals.17 In its details, however, the monitoring 
provisions reflect the desire of the drafters to innovate towards the remedia-
tion of existing treaty body deficits and espouse many of the suggestions of 
the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).18 
b. The Committee 
The Committee was initially constituted of twelve experts but the pace of 
state ratification allowed it to expand to its maximum authorized number 
of eighteen experts.19 The criteria for Committee experts, who serve in their 
   of Persons with Disabilities on its Seventh Session, U.N. GAOR, Ad Hoc Comm., 7th 
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/AC.265/2006/2 (2006), available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/
enable/rights/ahc7report-e.htm. It should be noted that Mexico tabled a “non-paper” at 
the Eighth Ad Hoc Committee meeting after being tasked with facilitating the discussion 
on monitoring and consolidating the various proposals into a document. See Non-Paper 
on Monitoring: Draft Elements for a Monitoring Mechanism of the International Conven-
tion on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (15 June 2006), available at http://www.
un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahc8docs/ahc8npmexico.doc.
15. The OHCHR website contains detailed information on the operation of the United 
Nations human rights treaty bodies, available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBODIES/
Pages/HumanRightsBodies.aspx.
16. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966, G.A. 
Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., art. 41, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 
171 (entered into force 23 Mar. 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]; Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966, G.A. Res. 
2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., art. 5, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 
171 (entered into force 23 Mar. 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR Optional Protocol]; Conven-
tion Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
adopted 10 Dec. 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., art. 17, U.N. Doc. 
A/39/51 (1985), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force 26 June 1987) [hereinafter CAT]; 
Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or De-
grading Treatment or Punishment, adopted 18 Dec. 2002, G.A. Res. 57/199, art. 19, U.N. 
Doc. A/Res/57/199 (entered into force 22 June 2006) [hereinafter OPCAT]; Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, adopted 18 Dec. 
1979, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., art. 17, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1980), 
1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force 3 Sept. 1981) [hereinafter CEDAW]; International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted 21 Dec. 
1965, G.A. Res. 2106 (XX), U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., art. 8, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1966), 
660 U.N.T.S. 195, (entered into force 4 Jan. 1969) [hereinafter CERD]. 
17. See infra, text at notes 69–82.
18. See OHCHR Monitoring Overview, supra note 12; OHCHR Expert Paper, supra note 
12. We discuss the Committee’s potential to innovate infra, Part III.
19. See CRPD, supra note 1, art. 34(2). Following an additional sixty states parties’ ratifica-
tions, Committee membership can attain a maximum number of eighteen experts. See 
id. art. 34(2). For information concerning Committee membership, updated list of states 
parties as well as information on the first Conference of States Parties, see United Nations 
Enable website, available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/convtexte.htm.
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individual capacity, require a person to be competent, experienced, and 
possess high moral standing.20 Committee members are elected to four-year 
terms and are eligible once for re-election.21 Significantly, the incorporation 
of term limits is designed to ensure the vitality, impartiality, and indepen-
dence of the Committee and respond to critiques that the absence of term 
limits in most treaty bodies compromises the long-term independence of 
the body and can serve to inhibit its dynamism.22 
States parties are encouraged to consult closely with and actively involve 
persons with disabilities23 in nominating their own nationals for committee 
election at Conferences of States Parties24 and to give “due consideration” 
for representation by persons with disabilities on the monitoring body.25 
This last provision is at variance with established practice and responds to 
concerns, common to marginalized groups, that only effective participation 
by experts bearing their group membership characteristics can ensure effec-
tive implementation of rights.26
The Committee’s mandate in the context of disability parallels that of 
existing human rights treaty monitoring bodies.27 It is tasked with imple-
menting the Convention’s stated purpose “to promote, protect and ensure 
the full and equal enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms 
by all persons with disabilities, and to promote respect for their inherent 
20. See CRPD, supra note 1, art. 34(3).
21. See id. art. 34(7). One third of the originally elected experts were to have only two year 
terms, as selected by lottery.
22. The imposition of term limits was supported by the OHCHR and was also reflected in 
the Enforced Disappearances Convention that was concurrently under negotiation. See 
OHCHR Expert Paper, supra note 12, ¶ 17; Enforced Disappearances Convention, supra 
note 6, pt. II, art. 26, ¶ 4.
23. See CRPD, supra note 1, art. 4(3).
24. See id. art. 34(5).
25. See id. art. 34(3). 
26. See id.; cf. CEDAW, supra note 16, art. 17 (“experts of high moral standing and com-
petence in the field covered by the Convention” shall “serve in their personal capacity, 
consideration being given to equitable geographical distribution and to the representation 
of the different forms of civilization as well as the principal legal systems”). Note, too, 
the progressive development of overall composition criteria as reflected in the require-
ment that consideration be given to balanced gender representation in both the Enforced 
Disappearances Convention, supra note 6, art. 26(1), as well as the OPCAT, supra note 
16, art. 5(4). It should be noted that proposals among some members of the disability 
community that the Committee be composed entirely of persons with disabilities, thereby 
underscoring the central importance of lived experience with disability, was not taken 
up by the Ad Hoc Committee, nor was the proposal that the Chair of the CRPD Com-
mittee be a person with a disability. It should be noted, however, that the composition 
of the first duly constituted Committee does indeed reflect cross-disability experience 
and expertise. For details as to the current membership of the CRPD Committee, see 
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/convtexte.htm.
27. See especially Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 
44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 166, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989), arts. 43–45 [hereinafter 
CRC]. 
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dignity.”28 As with other established human rights bodies, the Committee is 
empowered to pursue its agenda by monitoring reports of states parties,29 
assessing information and shadow reports provided by DPOs and other in-
terested non-state actors,30 issuing general comments and recommendations, 
and transmitting a biennial report to the General Assembly.31 Similarly, the 
Committee will establish its own procedural rules32 consistent with other 
treaty bodies33 and convene its initial meeting.34 The Secretary-General must 
provide the Committee with sufficient staffing and facilities to effectively 
perform its duties.35
C. Innovations 
The final form taken by the Convention’s monitoring system includes 
some of the more progressive core features suggested by the NHRI and 
Mexican proposals.36 Especially innovative for human rights treaties are 
provisions allowing the Committee to receive collective complaints,37 
elicit the expertise and input of DPOs38 and UN specialized agencies and 
organs,39 and enact procedures to better manage reporting deadlines.40 The 
28. See CRPD, supra note 1, art. 1.
29. See id. art. 35–37. 
30. See id. art. 38(b).
31. See id. art. 39.
32. Id. art. 34(10).
33. See, e.g., CRC, supra note 27, art. 43(8). OHCHR has noted the drawbacks associated 
with the ad hoc development of rules of procedures among the various treaty bodies 
that had led to variations in practice that can be confusing to states and other actors 
within the system and that some level of coordination could enhance working methods 
and coherency of the system. OHCHR Monitoring Overview, supra note 12, ¶ 44. 
34. The first Committee meeting was convened in Geneva on February 23, 2009. Informa-
tion on the first session is available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRPD/Pages/
Session1.aspx. 
35. Monitoring Overview, supra note 12, art. 34(11). 
36. See Asia Pacific Proposal, supra note 8; Mexico Proposal, supra note 8. The NHRIs may 
be credited with proposing a Committee empowered to receive collective complaints 
by and on behalf of individuals with disabilities, and to proactively inquire into the 
situation of persons with disabilities. Clearly traceable to the original Mexico proposal 
are a Committee with traditional reporting obligations as well as communications and 
inquiry procedures housed separately in the Optional Protocol. So, too, is the provision 
on Conferences of States Parties which, although it manifested in a more condensed 
form, is a key innovation in human rights conventions.
37. CRPD Optional Protocol, supra note 2, art. 1(1).
38. See CRPD, supra note 1, art. 4(3) (making consultations with disabled persons and their 
representative organizations a general obligation); Id. art. 33(3) (requiring states parties 
to include civil society in the monitoring process at the national level); Id. arts. 34(3), 
35(4) (calling on states parties to consider consultations with NGOs in the formulation 
of Committee member nominations as well as in the preparation of reports). 
39. See id. art. 38(a). 
40. See id. art. 36(2). 
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provision convening a periodic Conference of States Parties to consider 
implementation matters is likewise a novelty.41
1. Collective Complaints 
The Committee is authorized to accept and deliberate upon individual and 
group communications regarding alleged violations of the CRPD42 asserted 
against states parties to the Optional Protocol.43 Communications may 
also be submitted on behalf of aggrieved individuals, thereby implying the 
involvement of DPOs, NGOs, and other advocates in advancing claims.44 
Otherwise, the admissibility of communications mirrors that of other inter-
national complaints procedures.45 Likewise, the Committee may at any time 
after receiving a communication but before determining its merits, request a 
state party to adopt sufficient interim measures “to avoid possible irreparable 
damage” to the alleged victims of its actions.46 The Committee’s request, 
however, does not imply the ultimate admissibility or merits of the given 
communication.47 Communication procedures are confidential and issued 
recommendations are not enforceable.48 
2. DPO Participation 
The participation of persons with disabilities and DPOs in Convention-
related monitoring and implementation at all levels is both implicitly49 and 
explicitly woven throughout the entire fabric of the text.50 DPO participation 
is implicitly provided for in the monitoring process insofar as states parties 
are directed to consider consultations with civil society in the formulation 
of Committee member nominations51 as well as in the preparation of their 
41. See id. art. 40.
42. See CRPD Optional Protocol, supra note 2, art. 1(1).
43. See id. art. 1(2).
44. See id. art. 1(1).
45. Communications are inadmissible when made anonymously, when the underlying 
events occurred before the relevant state party ratified the Optional Protocol and did 
not continue after that time, when the “same matter” has been considered previously by 
the Committee or is currently under review “under another procedure of international 
investigation or settlement,” where the complainant has failed to exhaust domestic 
remedies (unless these can be shown as unreasonably obfuscatory or inefficacious), 
where the communication is unfounded or unsubstantiated, or where it abuses the right 
to submit under, or conflicts with, the CRPD’s provisions. See id. art. 2(a)-(f). 
46. Id. art. 4(1).
47. See id. art. 4(2). 
48. See id. art. 5.
49. Implicit participation is created through the vehicle of the general obligation, and the 
general principles of participation and inclusion. See id.
50. See generally Michael A. Stein & Janet E. Lord, Jacobus tenBroek, Participatory Justice, 
and the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 13 Tex. J. C.l. & C.R. 
167 (2008) (discussing the participatory justice dynamic of the convention). 
51. CRPD, supra note 1, art. 34(3).
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reports.52 These features together represent perhaps one of the most pro-
gressive developments in human rights law provided by the CRPD (even if 
stakeholder input is at times informally encouraged by other treaty bodies).53 
It reflects the fundamental principle that the persons most affected have the 
right to participate in decisions that impact them. In the disability context 
more specifically, it represents a sharp turn from marginalization and lack 
of voice in decisional processes. Moreover, the experience of the Ad Hoc 
Committee sessions demonstrates that including the targeted group facilitated 
negotiations by educating states representatives about these individuals as 
well as lending credibility to the substance of the treaty.54
3. Input from UN Specialized Agencies and Organs
To foment effective implementation of the CRPD, including international 
cooperation, the Committee is authorized to consult with “other relevant 
bodies instituted by international human rights treaties.”55 In particular, it 
envisages that the Committee will have due regard to the work of other 
treaty bodies whose work will necessarily overlap with it and also take 
into account the on-going interest in ensuring that the reporting process is 
meaningful without being duplicative.56 The Committee is also encouraged 
to cooperate with United Nations specialized agencies and other organs.57 
These in turn are “entitled to be represented” during CRPD implementation,58 
which would include not only the reporting process but also Conferences 
of States Parties; moreover, they may be invited by the Committee to share 
technical assistance and to submit reports.59 Such bodies are a potentially 
important resource for the Committee to tap into in order to effectively fulfill 
its mandate. Some of the specialized agencies possess considerable expertise 
in relation to particular issue areas covered by the Convention.
52. Id. art. 35(4).
53. Id. art. 4(3) (referencing the important role of persons with disabilities and their represen-
tative organizations in the development and implementation of legislation and policies 
that give effect to the CRPD).
54. For more on the role of DPO participation in the CRPD drafting process and voice 
accountability, see Janet E. Lord, Disability Rights and the Human Rights Mainstream: 
Reluctant Gatecrashers?, in The inTeRnaTional sTRUggle FoR new hUman RighTs (Clifford Bob 
ed., 2009). See also Janet E. Lord, Mirror, Mirror on the Wall: Voice Accountability and 
NGOs in Human Rights Standard Setting, 5 seTon hall J. dipl. & inT’l Rel. 93 (2004).
55. See CRPD, supra note 1, art. 38(b). 
56. The rationale for such inclusion by the CRPD is “with a view to ensuring the consistency 
of their respective reporting guidelines, suggestions and general recommendations, and 
avoiding duplication and overlap in the performance of their functions.” See id.
57. Id. art. 38. 
58. Id. art. 38(a). 
59. Id.
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4. Reporting Deadlines
Within two years of the Convention entering into force (3 May 2008), each 
state party must submit to the Committee via the Secretary-General “a 
comprehensive report on measures taken to give effect to its [CRPD] obliga-
tions,”60 and may also identify impediments to fulfilling those obligations.61 
Subsequently, states parties must submit reports on at least a quadrennial 
basis.62 The Committee is given the flexibility to request more frequent re-
ports, which is distinct among human rights conventions negotiated prior to 
the CRPD.63 The Committee’s power to prescribe content guidelines makes 
explicit a practice that has developed over time and has been particularly 
effective in the context of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.64 The 
role of the Committee in articulating reporting guidelines is a particularly 
important one and the Committee should take up the challenge to follow 
the best practices of existing treaty body practice in formulating and progres-
sively developing over time its guidelines.65 When appropriate the Committee 
may disseminate reports, along with its observations, recommendations, and 
requests for technical assistance or advice, to United Nations specialized 
entities “and other competent bodies.”66 
5. Conference of States Parties 
CRPD Article 40 provides for periodic meetings of state parties to assess the 
implementation of the treaty, and is thus unique among core human rights 
conventions.67 While previous human rights conventions reference meet-
ings of states parties, these mechanisms are intended to be used for limited 
60. Id. art. 35(1).
61. Id. art. 35(5). 
62. Id. art. 35(2).
63. For more on discretion in the context of treaty body reporting periodicity, see OHCHR 
Monitoring Overview, supra note 12, ¶ 16. The Human Rights Committee has adopted 
similar procedures, although it has yet to implement them. 
64. CRPD, supra note 1, art. 35(3). The CRC Committee is particularly notable for its detailed 
Guidelines and its novel grouping of CRC provisions in those Guidelines in thematic 
clusters to facilitate state parties in their reporting efforts. See General Guidelines regarding 
the Form and Contents of Initial Reports U.N. Doc. CRC/C/5, 30 Oct. 1991, available 
at http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/resguide/spechr.htm; General Guidelines regarding the 
Form and Content of Periodic Reports, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/58 (11 Oct. 1996), available 
at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/guidelines.htm. 
65. Guidelines on reporting “are designed to ensure that reports are presented in a uniform 
manner so that [the treaty body] can obtain a complete picture of the situation of imple-
mentation.” OHCHR Expert Paper, supra note 12, at ¶ 33. For a thorough account of 
reporting under existing bodies and suggestions directly pertaining to the formulation 
of reporting procedures under the CRPD, see OHCHR Monitoring Overview, supra note 
12, ¶¶ 20–40.
66. CRPD, supra note 1, arts. 36(5), 38(a). 
67. See id. art 40. For a discussion of Conferences of States Parties within the context of the 
CRPD negotiations, see OHCHR Expert Paper, supra note 12, ¶¶ 65–66.
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purposes pertaining to the election of Committee members or amendments 
and not for the broader purpose envisioned by the drafters of the CRPD.68 
Instead, the Conference of States Parties introduced by the Convention more 
closely approximate those seen in international environmental or arms control 
contexts.69 This is because they are meant to facilitate implementation by 
drawing together a wide range of actors, including states parties, relevant 
United Nations agencies, DPOs, NGOs, and others to provide a forum for 
discussion and reflection on how to best operationalize the Convention.70 
Consensus by the states parties on politically charged issues might obviate 
the type of criticisms lodged against the Human Rights Committee that it 
stretched its mandate by claiming implied powers. 
III. ALTERNATIVE CRPD MONITORING PROPOSALS 
Negotiation of the CRPD offered the prospect for developing an innovative 
monitoring scheme that departed significantly from standard human rights 
monitoring approaches, and significant innovations were incorporated. 
Nevertheless, because the monitoring debate was deferred until the last Ad 
Hoc session, when strong concerns arose about concluding the negotiations 
before consensus unraveled, in the end creativity gave way to expediency.71 
One might take the view that this is water under the bridge, and yet it stands 
to reason that alternative proposals floated during the CRPD negotiations 
could well inform ongoing dialogue on monitoring in continuing discus-
sions on human rights treaty body reform. Accordingly, the discussion that 
follows highlights some of the key alterative options put forward during 
CRPD negotiations, while Part IV offers suggestions on how such innova-
tions could yet be realized.
A. The Ad Hoc Drafters as Agents of Change 
The drafters of the CRPD understood that the vast majority of states did not 
have comprehensive disability legislation. Further, drafters recognized that 
68. The Mexican draft convention text was the first to include the broad conceptualization 
of the Conference of States Parties. See Mexico Proposal, supra note 8. 
69. See, e.g., Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer 
of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, adopted 18 Sept. 1997, art. 11, 2056 
U.N.T.S. 211 (entered into force 1 Mar. 1999) [hereinafter Mine Ban Treaty] available 
at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=26&subid=A&lang=en.
70. See CRPD, supra note 1, art. 40. 
71. One might note that a similar dynamic existed in 1984 during negotiations of the Con-
vention against Torture, whose deliberations were influenced by Western states seeking 
quick adoption and communist states wishing weaker implementation mechanisms. 
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all too often existing legislation was very narrow in scope and reflected a 
medical/charity model rather than a rights-based approach to disability.72 
It was thus readily acknowledged that a new monitoring mechanism must 
do more than monitor existing laws. It must be equipped to provide techni-
cal assistance to states in the development of new legislation and, where 
applicable, in improving and enforcing existing legislation in line with the 
CRPD. Relatedly, and somewhat unlike the situation with other marginal-
ized groups such as women, children, and racial minorities, most states do 
not have anything approaching reliable statistics and data of populations of 
person with disabilities. Statistical information is considered fundamental 
for supporting implementation. Lack of empirically verifiable data helped 
stimulate the idea that a monitoring mechanism should contribute to the 
creation of accurate in-country databases that in turn could enhance the 
capacity of states to craft responsive public policies. 
Finally, a new monitoring mechanism was regarded as a core component 
of addressing gaps caused by the lack of engagement by existing treaty bodies 
in disability rights issues coupled with the non-participation of DPOs in the 
UN human rights system in any sustained way. Some of the proposals tabled 
before the Ad Hoc Committee, but ultimately not taken up or reflected in 
the final text in their entirety, sought to help transform the existing system of 
monitoring and implementation into a more proactive and robust framework. 
Should these be acted upon, either through formal UN reform or (more likely) 
procedurally by the Committee, they can help reshape human rights treaty 
monitoring and implementation in a progressive direction.
b. National Action Plans and NHRI Advocacy on Monitoring
One of the more comprehensive and creative schemes for monitoring the 
future treaty was suggested at the sixth Ad Hoc Committee session by the 
Asia Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Institutions73 and taken up with 
enthusiasm by experts who convened to consider monitoring approaches.74 
72. See Michael Ashley Stein & Penelope J. S. Stein, Beyond Disability Civil Rights, 58 hasT-
ings l. J. 1203, 1203 (2007). (“Unfortunately, the continuing economic inequities and 
social exclusion of disabled persons worldwide severely calls into doubt the efficacy 
of these efforts. It also begs the question of whether any country adequately protects its 
disabled citizens.”)
73. See Asia Pacific Proposal, supra note 8. Many of the ideas reflected in the proposals put 
forward by NHRIs were first put forward at a conference convened by the Harvard Law 
School Project on Disability, at Harvard Law School, in advance of the Sixth Session of 
the Ad Hoc Committee. 
74. The Asia Pacific Proposal also included guidelines for rigorous national level implemen-
tation. Asia Pacific Proposal, supra note 8, arts. 25bis-27, 31–33. A number of other 
proposals emphasized the role of national level monitoring. For a compilation of these
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The NHRIs proposed an international monitoring body comprised of a ma-
jority of persons with disabilities75 that would consult with DPOs76 and be 
assisted in its duties by a global disability rights advocate.77 The proposed 
committee would have been able to examine the situation of persons with 
disabilities by receiving collective complaints,78 by applying its own proac-
tive inquiries,79 and through regional assessments.80 
A particularly far-reaching innovation required states parties to submit 
national action plans, which are a core feature of disability rights imple-
mentation in Australia and heavily touted by Australian NHRI and NGO 
representatives.81 The rationale for this proposal was the view that national 
action plans can serve as an anchor for monitoring compliance with obli-
gations. The process by which national action plans are developed triggers 
governments to think of how they will implement and what priorities they 
have given their own situation.82 Thus, under this mechanism, development 
of the plans could have provided a centerpiece for monitoring; completed 
plans might have provided guidance for a treaty monitoring body in an 
individualized examination of treaty implementation by a state party. An 
additional advantage is that the explicit incorporation of national level 
planning within the framework of the CRPD could help to shift the focus of 
implementation away from the singular focus on reporting.83 
   proposals from governments, NGOs and NHRIs pertaining to national-level monitoring 
and implementation, see Compilation of Proposals on a Monitoring Mechanism for an 
International Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 53–59 (12 May 2006) 
[hereinafter Compilation of Proposals] available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/
documents/mntrng_cmpltn.doc; see also Monitoring Symposium Report, supra note 8.
75. Asia Pacific Proposal, supra note 8, art. 28(2)(a). 
76. Id. art. 34.
77. Id. arts. 38–39. 
78. Id. art. 45.
79. Id. art. 38.
80. Id. art. 37. 
81. The NHRI proposal was inspired by a number of NGO proposals, including the report on 
the national consultations held in Australia and spearheaded by People with Disability 
Australia. See Comprehensive and Integral International Convention on the Rights of Per-
sons with Disabilities, Report on National Consultations (People with Disability Australia, 
Australian Federation of Disability Organizations, National Association of Community 
Legal Centers 79) (Aug. 2004), available at http://www.pwd.org.au/disabilityconvention/
convention_consult_report.doc. The Australian NGO report was instrumental in calling 
for the development, implementation and evaluation of progressive national action plans 
to facilitate implementation of treaty obligations. Id. ¶ 4.26.
82. For instance, national action plans cause developing countries, countries with federal/
provincial systems, or countries looking to progressively realize economic, social and 
cultural rights, to consider how to allocate their resources.
83. Compare Philip Alston, Richard Lillich Memorial Lecture: Promoting the Accountability of 
Members of the Human Rights Council, 15 J. TRansnaT’l l. & pol’y 49, 62 (2005) (“Under 
most of the core treaties, States Parties are required to make an initial report within 2 years 
and then to provide additional or ‘periodic’ reports every four or five years thereafter. 
Compliance with the obligation to report is central to the accountability mechanisms
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Given the emergence of national human rights action planning as a core 
strategy of NHRIs,84 the explicit mention of action plans within the context 
of national-level implementation of the CRPD could have underscored the 
role of those institutions in securing disability inclusion. As it stands, absent 
any explicit language to this effect, it will be up to governments, DPOs, and 
NHRIs acting on their own initiative to integrate disability rights into national 
human rights action plan monitoring schemes or to foster disability-specific 
human rights action planning. The Committee may yet take up this idea and 
make it part and parcel of its iterative communication with states parties in 
the reporting process. More helpfully, perhaps, would be the role that the 
Committee could play in providing specific guidance on disability-specific 
action planning in the form of a general comment. 
Finally, it should be noted that treaty reform dialogue has generated some 
ideas for strengthening the role of NHRIs in treaty body processes, again, 
issues that could have been taken up by the CRPD drafters.85 Moreover, 
several of the treaty bodies have issued general comments concerning the 
role of NHRIs. The potential for cross-fertilization has yet to be realized.86
C. Other Treaty body Reporting Innovations
The production of a report to a treaty body is intended to generate a dialogue 
within civil society about the requirements of the treaty, the application of 
the standards to local conditions, the shortfalls in compliance, priorities for 
   established under these treaties.”), with Jo M. Pasqualucci, The Right to a Dignified Life 
(Vide Digna): The Integration of Economic and Social Rights with Civil and Political 
Rights in the Inter-American Human Rights System, 31 hasTings inT’l & Comp. l. Rev. 1, 
12 (2008). 
Human rights treaties require that the signatory states ensure the rights protected to all persons 
without discrimination. Within this context, the American Convention and other human rights 
instruments specifically prohibit States from discriminating against persons on the basis of their 
‘economic status.’ States must protect and ensure the human rights of those subject to their juris-
diction whether they are poor or rich.
84. On national human rights action plans generally, see U.n. ohChR, handbook on na-
Tional hUman RighTs plans oF aCTion (2002), available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/
Publications/training10en.pdf.
85. See, e.g., Amnesty International, United Nations Proposals to Strengthen the Human 
Rights Treaty Bodies (Sept. 1, 2003), AI Index, IOR 40/018/2003, available at http://
asiapacific.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGIOR400182003?open&of=ENG-375.
86. See The Role of National Human Rights Institutions in the Protection of Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 10, U.N. ESCOR, Comm. on Econ., Soc. 
& Cult. Rts., 19th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/1999/22 at 18 (1998); Establishment of National 
Institutions to Facilitate Implementation of the Convention, General Recommendation 
No. 17, Comm. on the Elim. of Racial Discrim., U.N. GAOR, 42nd Sess., U.N. Doc. 
A/48/18 (1993); The Role of Independent National Human Rights Institutions in the 
Promotion and Protection of the Rights of the Child, General Comment No.2, U.N. 
GAOR, Comm. on Rts. of the Child, 32nd Sess., U.N. Doc. CRC/CG/2002/2 (2002).
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redress, and the design of a plan of action.87 A cycle of pre-report consul-
tation followed by post-report planning at the national level is supposed 
to be created via the periodic drafting of state reports.88 In practice this 
national-level planning has not always happened. Instead, report drafting, 
often done in backrooms without stakeholder engagement, has become the 
chief focus of national-level activity in connection with the human rights 
treaty reporting system.89 The NHRI proposal for national action plans was 
in part a response to this weakness in the traditional treaty body reporting 
process. Other proposals were put forward to tackle this issue, drawing in 
part on practices that have evolved in other international law contexts.90 
One of the more creative ideas originated in an informal request by 
Costa Rica for experts to look carefully at possible alternatives to the standard 
treaty body reporting schemes. Consequently, the Regional Group for Latin 
America and the Caribbean (GRULAC) through the Costa Rican Permanent 
Mission commissioned a paper91 on monitoring, that, among other things, 
suggested that the monitoring system utilized by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF)92 was worthy of study and adaptation. The IMF utilizes a the-
matic, targeted approach that includes visitation by experts and constructive 
dialogue with the state under review, rather than traditional state-based 
reporting.93 Under this approach, a treaty body might conduct a certain 
number of reports within each region per year and would be able to call 
for more targeted reporting in place of periodic reporting at fixed intervals.94 
Under this “reverse reporting” system, an entity other than the state under 
scrutiny prepares a report reviewing compliance commitments, based on 
87. See FUTURe oF Un, supra note 10. 
88. CRPD, supra note 1, arts. 35(2), 36. 
89. See FUTURe oF Un, supra note 10.
90. See, e.g., Monitoring Symposium Report, supra note 8. 
91. See Janet E. Lord & Katherine N. Guernsey, Checklist for the Formulation of Government 
Positions on Monitoring 2 (July 2005) (on file with authors).
92. See International Monetary Fund & World Bank, Strengthening Debt Management 
Practices—Lessons from Country Experiences and Issues Going Forward: Background 
Paper 3 (2007), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/2007/eng/032707b.pdf.
The process of moving from a set of general principles to a program of concrete reforms and ca-
pacity building in a particular country is not straightforward. Recognizing this, a joint World Bank 
and IMF pilot program including 12 countries was initiated in 2002, with the objective of assisting 
countries in designing and implementing reforms with corresponding capacity building of the areas 
of [public debt management] and domestic government debt market development. 
93. Under this process, states have the opportunity to respond to the expert-driven critique. 
See id. at 5.
Elements that bring about sustained reform included . . . [i]ntegrating the debt management reform 
process into broader programs, such as public sector or public financial management reforms. 
One benefit to this approach is that it helps ensure project sustainability and continuity through 
financing, support by experts, and project supervision.
94. For discussion of the periodicity of the current reporting process, see OHCHR Monitor-
ing Overview, supra note 12, ¶ 14 & tbl.2. 
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dialogue between the reviewing body and the government concerned. In 
this way, monitoring moves beyond self-reporting and self-certification to 
forms of external monitoring.
A group of experts convened at the American University, School of 
International Service, took this line of research farther and studied other 
types of peer review or “reverse reporting” mechanisms.95 Models noted for 
possible adaptation in a human rights context included the system adopted 
by the World Trade Organization by its Trade Policy Review Body96 and the 
OECD peer review system.97 This system of peer review mechanisms received 
attention in the OHCHR report on monitoring options for the CRPD.98 Such 
an approach might well have facilitated a deeper level of exchange, some-
thing the drafters recognized as important in the context of a complex and 
comprehensive treaty cutting across so many issues. Thus, for example, in 
international law contexts where peer review is used, it can serve to check 
compliance or, alternatively, to facilitate implementation by establishing a 
cooperative framework. In the nuclear safety context, peer review is used 
in two ways. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the World As-
sociation of Nuclear Operators (WANO), and the Institute of Nuclear Power 
Operations (INPO) utilize peer review in their safety review services, which 
involve the technical, on-site review of nuclear installations by nuclear plant 
operators.99 Another approach is embodied in the Convention on Nuclear 
Safety100 designed to monitor state compliance with the provisions of the 
treaty.101 The peer review system in the Convention on Nuclear Safety focuses 
95. See Monitoring Symposium Report, supra note 8, at 8–11.
96. Id. at 9. 
97. Id. at 9–10.
98. See OCHR Expert Paper, supra note 12, ¶¶ 67–72 (“A peer review mechanism involving 
systematic examination and assessment of the performance of a State by other States, 
with the ultimate goal of helping the reviewed State improve its policy making, adopt 
best practices and comply with established standards and principles may also be a 
valuable monitoring tool.”). Id ¶ 67. 
99. Under the IAEA system, a member state makes an official request to the IAEA concerning 
a particular nuclear facility in the state. Next, a preparatory meeting with the regulatory 
body and plant management occurs, followed by the recruitment of external experts, 
usually by the IAEA staff member leading the mission. Finally, technical preparation 
of the review mission begins. In some cases the plant is expected first to carry out 
an in-depth self-assessment of its management and operational practices. During the 
peer evaluation, expert missions conduct on-site evaluations of the nuclear facility and 
compare the domestic regulatory practices with the pertinent international guidelines. 
After the mission, the review team submits a final report of its recommendations and 
findings. See Monica J. Washington, The Practice of Peer Review in the International 
Nuclear Safety Regime, 72 n.y.U. l. Rev. 430 (1997).
100. Convention on Nuclear Safety, adopted 17 June 1994, INFCIRC/449 (1994); see gener-
ally Menno T. Kamminga, The IAEA Convention on Nuclear Safety, 44 inTl & Comp. l. 
Q. 872 (1995). 
101. Id. arts. 5, 20.
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on states’ behavior vis-à-vis the establishment of regulatory frameworks 
consistent with their treaty obligations.102 
While the Convention on Nuclear Safety does not purport to create the 
kind of specific international standards familiar to other treaty regimes, the 
system of incentives and accountability created by its peer review model 
was designed to facilitate the gradual phasing-in of standards promulgated 
by the IAEA. Thus, its model offers a type of review that is less adversarial 
than standard compliance-monitoring systems and more cooperative in the 
sense of providing a means of assisting nuclear operators with the applica-
tion of commonly accepted international practices.
The American University group further proposed that consideration be 
given to targeted inspections, thematic inquiries, and fact-finding under which 
certain thematic issue areas might be identified for external monitoring by 
fact-finding teams or inspection panels.103 Under this model, procedures 
would be focused; while they would not try to assess compliance across the 
board, they would set priorities for inspection, thereby making the process 
more efficient and effective. The primary models cited for this process were 
those which monitor prison conditions and the prevention of torture.104 It 
was also suggested that external monitoring might take the form of “chal-
lenge inspections” whereby a state might self-certify compliance with treaty 
obligations in a particular area (e.g., prison conditions for detainees with 
disabilities or conditions in institutions), and others, such as another state 
party, NGOs, or a treaty body, could challenge the veracity of the report 
and a neutral entity conduct the inspection.105 
These approaches are consistent with a core theme regarding the suc-
cessful implementation of the CRPD upheld by many during the treaty 
negotiation, namely, that effective implementation would require carrots 
and sticks. Indeed, many proposals for treaty body reform within the UN 
human rights system have emphasized that effective implementation rests 
not only with adversarial processes of engagement, but likewise with more 
creative and cooperative mechanisms that facilitate implementation through 
incentives for compliance.106
102. Id. arts. 7, 8. 
103. See Monitoring Symposium Report, supra note 8, at 8–11.
104. See id. at 10–11. 
105. See id. supra note 8, at 8–11.
106. See, e.g., Effective Functioning of Bodies Established Pursuant to United Nations Hu-
man Rights Instrument: Final Report on Enhancing the Long-Term Effectiveness of the 
United Nations Human Rights Treaty System, U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n on Hum. Rts., 
53rd Sess., Agenda Item 15, ¶ 33, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/74 (1996) available at http://
documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G97/114/45/pdf/G9711445.pdf (proposing, 
among other things, the establishment of a new state advisory services project that would 
assist states in conducting pre-ratification surveys and state reporting); Anne Gallagher, 
Making Human Rights Treaty Obligations a Reality: Working with New Actors and Part-
ners, in FUTURe oF Un, supra note 10, at 201 (proposing proactive engagement of treaty 
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D. Conference of States Parties as a Component of Implementation
The final text of the CRPD contains a less robust provision providing for a 
periodic Conference of States Parties than that supported by some adher-
ents.107 Some proposals called for a more developed provision, building in 
a detailed and far-reaching mandate for Conferences of States Parties and 
drawing on other provisions in international agreements.108 Traditionally, 
Conference of States Parties mechanisms are utilized by states parties to 
human rights conventions in order to amend or adopt protocols to existing 
agreements,109 rather than as mechanisms for engaging states parties on 
implementation dialogue.110 
Significantly, the Mexico proposal also included a provision allowing 
for a Conference of States Parties that would meet periodically to “[e]valu-
ate the operation and status of the Convention,” “[p]romote international 
cooperation and assistance,” “consider recommendations and suggestions 
   monitoring bodies by NHRIs, including involving NHRIs in the constructive dialogue 
process and in pre-review of state reports).
107. CRPD, supra note 1, art. 40.
108. Mexico contemplated the establishment of a Conference of States Parties mandated to 
(i) evaluate the operation and status of the Convention; (ii) promote international coop-
eration and assistance; (iii) consider the recommendations and suggestions put forward 
by the Committee; and (iv) elaborate a final report on the agreements reached at the 
Conference for submission to the Secretary General. See Mexico Proposal, supra note 
8, art. 19. The proposal put forward in the legal analysis prepared by Janet Lord and 
Katherine Guernsey solicited by the Permanent Mission of Mexico to the United Nations 
endorsed the concept of a Conference of States Parties and sought to endow the Confer-
ence with the authority to establish subsidiary bodies to help facilitate implementation. 
See Commentary of Landmine Survivors Network for the Permanent Mission of Mexico 
to the United Nations, art. 19, associated commentary (21 May 2003) (on file with the 
authors).
109. See, e.g., OPCAT, supra note 16; Convention on Conventional Weapons, Amended 
Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War, CCW/MSP/2003/3, appendix II (18 Feb. 
2004).
110. Human rights conventions have not traditionally utilized Conferences of States Parties 
to the extent that other international treaties have, and typically they make reference 
to such meetings only in the context of amending the convention but the CRPD goes 
further than previous human rights conventions. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 16, art. 
51(1).
Any State Party to the present Covenant may propose an amendment and file it with the Secretary-
General of the United Nations. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall thereupon com-
municate any proposed amendments to the States Parties to the present Covenant with a request 
that they notify him whether they favor a conference of States Parties for the purpose of considering 
and voting upon the proposals. In the event that at least one third of the States Parties favors such a 
conference, the Secretary-General shall convene the conference under the auspices of the United 
Nations. Any amendment adopted by a majority of the States Parties present and voting at the 
conference shall be submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations for approval. 
   ICCPR, supra note 16, art. 51(1). For a discussion of Conferences of States Parties within 
the context of the CRPD negotiations, see OHCHR Expert Paper, supra note 12, ¶¶ 
65–66.
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put forward by the Committee of Experts,” and “[e]laborate a final report 
on the agreements reached at the Conference and submit it to the Secretary 
General of the United Nations.” While the final text provides scope for the 
Secretariat of Conferences of States Parties to utilize the forum in a way that 
advances implementation along the lines of the Conference of States Par-
ties to the Mine Ban Treaty111 or other international agreements, it remains 
unclear whether it will be developed in such a direction. 
E. Regional Engagement
The issue of regional-level engagement on disability issues and, in particular, 
CRPD implementation, was the focus of intense lobbying among some par-
ticipants. An early monitoring proposal in the Bangkok draft clearly emanated 
from the successful work in the Asia Pacific region under the Economic and 
Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific and its Decade on Disabled Per-
sons.112 This proposal required the treaty body to meet periodically within 
the regions under the auspices of existing regional commissions.113 Similarly, 
other proposals reflected the recent practice of the OHCHR and its regional 
engagement for treaty body follow-up procedures.114 For example, it hosted 
111. Pursuant to Articles 11 & 12 of the Mine Ban Treaty, periodic meetings of states parties 
form part of the implementation process. See Mine Ban Treaty, supra note 69. Meet-
ings of states parties were held on an annual basis during the first five years of the 
life of the treaty, along with intercessional meetings, all of which helped to jump start 
the implementation process. Thereafter, review conferences were held to continue the 
implementation process. This could well have been an approach taken with regard to 
the CRPD, committing to regular meetings of states parties in the initial phase of the 
Convention’s entry into force. For more on Mine Ban Treaty implementation and meetings 
of states parties, see the International Campaign to Ban Landmines website, available 
at http://www.icbl.org/treaty/meetings.
112. See United Nations, “Foreword,” Focus on Ability, Celebrate Diversity: Highlights of 
the Asian and Pacific Decade of Disabled Persons, 1993–2002, Social Policy Paper No. 
13 (2003), available at http://www.unescap.org/esid/psis/publications/spps/13/foreword.
htm.
113. See Bangkok Proposal, supra note 9, pmbl(d). (“Noting with great satisfaction that the 
Standard Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities have 
played an important role in influencing the promotion, formulation, and evaluation of 
the policies, plans, programs, and actions at the national, regional, and international 
levels to further the equalization of opportunities by, for and with persons with disabili-
ties.”) Id. art. 40(4). (“The meetings of the Committee shall be held at United Nations 
Headquarters and on a rotational basis at the offices of the regional commissions of the 
United Nations.”) 
114. See oFFiCe oF UniTed naTions high CommissioneR FoR hUman RighTs, annUal RepoRT 2005: 
implemenTaTion oF aCTiviTies and Use oF FUnds 36 (2005), available at http://www.ohchr.org/
Documents/AboutUs/annualreport2005.pdf 
A number of activities were carried out to facilitate and enhance implementation of treaty body 
recommendations at the country level. Three national follow-up workshops were convened in 
Croatia, Rwanda and Sri Lanka and one global training session for participants from five coun-
tries was held in Geneva in May for representatives of NGOs, national human rights institutions 
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regional meetings to follow up on various treaty bodies’ concluding obser-
vations as a means for government actors and civil society to participate in 
these international processes.115 Some cautioned against taking the concept 
of regional implementation too far, stating that while regional dialogue and 
information sharing should be encouraged, a monitoring system that leads 
to regional interpretations of an international convention––and therefore 
potentially conflicting jurisprudence––may not be desirable.116 
Still, the opportunity to ensure some level of engagement among states 
on CRPD implementation at the regional level through explicit language 
in the text was lost. Also gone was the potential for dialogue that might 
foster information sharing and knowledge transfer in what will most surely 
be a busy period of law reform and development in the ratification phase. 
Given the dearth of appropriate disability law frameworks at the national 
level, particularly in view of ratification by the European Community, such 
an opportunity could have been fruitful. Nevertheless, regional cooperation 
has been growing, with a particularly strong example being the sponsoring 
of workshops and sharing of technical information and best practices by the 
Asia Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Institutions.117 
F. Implementation Facilitation beyond Traditional Human Rights 
Monitoring Schemes
There is merit in exploring how traditional approaches to monitoring by 
human rights institutions could be usefully expanded to include compo-
nents seen in other treaty contexts. This is particularly true for the practice 
of establishing technical advisory bodies, an issue discussed among some 
participants in the monitoring debates. In this context, proponents pointed 
to a number of environmental conventions that have established subsidiary 
and the media to encourage engagement with the human rights treaty body system. The global 
session followed national preparatory workshops in the five participating countries: Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Mauritius, Thailand, Uganda and Zambia. 
115. Id. 
A follow-up workshop on the implementation of recommendations of the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child was held in Buenos Aires, Argentina in November 2005 in cooperation with 
Plan International and UNICEF. The Branch supported the deployment of human rights officers 
to OHCHR regional offices in Santiago and Bangkok, as well as to the newly established field 
office in Nepal. 
116. Indeed the issue of normative consistency has arisen not only vis-à-vis regional human 
rights systems but also within the human rights treaty monitoring systems itself where 
there is recognition of the need to maintain consistency among the treaty bodies. UN 
Initial Report, supra note 10, at 49–51.
117. See The asia paCiFiC FoRUm oF naTional hUman RighTs insTiTUTions advisoRy CoUnCil oF JURisTs, 
inTeRim RepoRT (2006), available at http://www.ahrcentre.org/documents/ACJ%20maria%20
graterol.pdf.
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bodies to undertake particular advisory and related roles to facilitate and 
support implementation.118 These bodies perform specialized functions that 
a treaty monitoring body alone would be unable to undertake. 
As an example, the Convention on Biological Diversity119 established a 
Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical, and Technological Advice, as well as 
other subsidiary organs such as an Open Ended Working Group on Biosafety, 
an Expert Panel on Access and Benefit Sharing, and an Open Ended Ad Hoc 
Working Group on Article 8(j), which relates to the preservation of practices 
of indigenous and local communities relevant to biodiversity.120 Thus, where 
particular expertise is required to assess information relating to the implemen-
tation of a treaty, technical bodies may serve a useful purpose and can serve 
a treaty body and states parties by acting in an advisory capacity. Technical 
committees of this nature typically have data-gathering and specific thematic 
advisory roles, quite apart from the monitoring responsibilities of the main 
treaty monitoring committee. Such treaty-established technical bodies are 
often comprised of individuals with particularized expertise.121 A technical 
body appointed by the CRPD Committee could also emulate work in the 
environmental and arms control areas by suggesting empirical indicators that 
would facilitate individual and comparative analysis on progress achieved 
under the Convention. 
While the idea to provide an explicit mandate for the Conference of States 
Parties—or even the Committee—to establish such technical bodies was not 
taken up by the drafters, there is nothing within the terms of the CRPD to 
prohibit this type of innovation.122 There are some obvious issue areas that 
could benefit from such an approach, where a technical advisory body might 
118. See, e.g., Monitoring Symposium Report, supra note 8, at 5, 8.
119. Convention on Biological Diversity, adopted 5 June 1992, U.N.T.S. 1993 (entered into 
force, 29 Dec. 1993), available at http://www.cbd.int/convention/convention.shtml.
120. For more on the institutions established pursuant to the Convention on Biological Diver-
sity, see the official Convention website, Text of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
adopted 5 June 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79 (entered into force 29 Dec. 1993) available at 
http://www.cbd.int/convention/convention.shtml.
121. Thus, for example, a subsidiary body established pursuant to the Convention on the 
Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals of 1979 (the Bonn Convention), the 
Scientific Council of the Bonn Convention, provides that its members shall consist of 
“qualified experts.” See Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild 
Animals, (23 June 1979), art. VIII(2), 1990 U.K.T.S. No. 87, available at http://www.cms.
int/pdf/convtxt/cms_convtxt_english.pdf.
122. For more on subsidiary bodies, particularly in the context of environmental law agree-
ments where they are common, see Robin R. Churchill & Geir Ulfstein, Autonomous 
Institutional Arrangements: A Little-Noticed Phenomenon in International Law, 94 am. 
J. inT’l l. 623, 626 (2000). Significantly, Churchill and Ulfstein argue persuasively that 
the doctrine of implied powers should apply when determining the internal powers of 
institutions created by way of international agreements. See id. at 633–34. This argument 
could well be applied to both the CRPD Conference of States Parties and, potentially, the 
CRPD Committee itself with regard to certain institutional decision-making matters such 
as the creation of working groups or other subsidiary bodies, among other things. 
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be appropriate. A technical body could: develop and facilitate implementation 
of accessibility standards as under Article 9; further explicate how the general 
principles of the CRPD of Article 3 should animate approaches to habilitation 
and rehabilitation under Article 26 and the provision of health care services 
in Article 25; and, finally, create possible frameworks for implementing the 
progressive but under-developed model for supported decision-making of 
Article 12. The CEDAW Committee provides a good practice example in 
developing innovative relationships with NGOs and other interested groups 
through non-binding communications that include conferences and working 
groups for the development of general recommendations.
G. Financial Mechanism Proposals
Some participants during the CRPD development process emphasized the 
necessity of appropriate financial support to facilitate implementation.123 Their 
assertions were bolstered by the fact that some eighty percent of persons 
with disabilities live in poverty in the developing world,124 and that the vast 
majority of states, both developed and developing have little in the way of 
rights-based disability domestic law and policy frameworks.125 Although many 
of the treaty obligations might be readily implemented without an extensive 
outlay of resources, the comprehensive nature of the treaty coupled with 
the undeveloped state of disability laws, policies, and programs will require 
financial resources.126 
123. See, e.g., 4th Sess. of the Ad Hoc Comm., 5th Summary, U.N. Convention on the Rights 
of People with Disabilities (27 Aug. 2004) (intervention by Cuba). In supporting the 
need for international cooperation and financial support of developing countries, the 
representative for Cuba identified: “a number of challenges for developing countries 
seeking to promote the human rights of persons with disabilities, including shortage of 
resources, poverty, foreign debt, ‘imposition of neo-liberal policies,’ globalization, and a 
‘prevailing unjust world order.’” Id. See also 4th Sess. of the Ad Hoc Comm., 6th Summ., 
U.N. Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities (30 Aug. 2004), available 
at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahc4sum30aug.htm. (Intervention by the 
Coordinator) (expressing his understanding that the language referencing international 
cooperation involves “recognition that there are some provisions with considerable eco-
nomic impact and that will require the application of considerable financial resources 
by States to implement them.”)
124. See seCond annUal RepoRT on The implemenTaTion oF Usaid disabiliTy poliCy 2 (2000), avail-
able at http://pdf.dec.org/pdf_docs/PDABT610.pdf. For a sense of the varying levels of 
disability reported from country-to-country, see United Nations Department of Economics 
and Social Affairs, Statistics Division. Demographic and Social Statistics, available at 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/sconcerns/disability.
125. See Stein & Stein, supra note 72, at 1205 (“[I]t is imperative to identify good legislative 
practices that can be used as models by States, especially for the majority that lack 
domestic disability-related measures.”)
126. For a review of the underdeveloped state of domestic disability law circa 2002, see Theresia 
Degener & Gerard Quinn, A Survey of International, Comparative and Regional Disability 
Law Reform, in disabiliTy RighTs law and poliCy: inTeRnaTional and naTional peRspeCTives 3, 
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It was against this backdrop that the issue of financial support arose in 
various contexts throughout the negotiations. Much of the debate revolved 
around the controversial insertion of an article on international coopera-
tion.127 Several states took “international cooperation” as code for resource 
transfers from developed countries to developing countries.128 This tension 
was resolved by the inclusion of a much weakened provision on international 
cooperation that removed language that would clearly obligate resource 
transfers.129 There were, however, some informal discussions that sought to 
explore other avenues of financial support for implementation, including the 
establishment of new financial mechanisms or the engagement of existing 
ones.130 One report reviewed progress made in the international environ-
mental realm, where it is now readily recognized that the development of 
   25–45 (Mary Lou Breslin & Sylvia Yee eds., 2002), available at http://www.dredf.org/
international/degener_quinn.html. For a perspective on the need for financial assistance 
for developing countries, see People with Disability Australia, Intervention by NGO 
Delegate from Vanuatu, John Suran at the Sixth Session of the Ad Hoc Committee, U.N. 
Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities (Aug. 2005). 
127. See CRPD Optional Protocol, supra note 2, art 32(1).
States Parties recognize the importance of international cooperation and its promotion, in support 
of national efforts for the realization of the purpose and objectives of the present Convention, 
and will undertake appropriate and effective measures in this regard, between and among States 
and, as appropriate, in partnership with relevant international and regional organizations and civil 
society, in particular organizations of persons with disabilities. Such measures could include, inter 
alia: (a) Ensuring that international cooperation, including international development programmes, 
is inclusive of and accessible to persons with disabilities; (b) Facilitating and supporting capacity-
building, including through the exchange and sharing of information, experiences, training pro-
grammes and best practices; (c) Facilitating cooperation in research and access to scientific and 
technical knowledge; (d) Providing, as appropriate, technical and economic assistance, including 
by facilitating access to and sharing of accessible and assistive technologies, and through the 
transfer of technologies. 2. The provisions of this article are without prejudice to the obligations 
of each State Party to fulfil its obligations under the present Convention.
128. This undercurrent is well reflected in the debates on Article 32. See, e.g., Disability 
Treaty Negotiations Daily Summaries (2 & 3 Feb. 2006), available at http://www.un.org/
esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahc7sum02feb.htm; http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/
ahc7sum03feb.htm.
129. CRPD Optional Protocol, supra note 2, art. 32(2), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/
english/law/disabilities-convention.htm. 
The first section of the article is identical in the draft version; however, two distinct versions of 
section (2) are proposed: [2. States Parties recognize further that while international cooperation 
plays a supplementary and supportive role, each State Party undertakes to fulfill its obligations under 
the present Convention.] [2. The provisions of this article are without prejudice to the obligations 
of each State Party to fulfill its obligations under the present Convention.].
130. A strong undercurrent was the overwhelming consensus that the existing human rights 
treaty body system was woefully under funded, as emphasized in countless treaty body 
reform papers. See, e.g., UN Initial Report, supra note 10, ¶¶ 54–109 (arguing against 
voluntary state funding of the treaty body system and amendment of existing human 
rights treaties to vest funding responsibility in the UN, coupled with suspension of rights 
for non-payment and the pursuit of alternate funding); Elizabeth Evatt, Ensuring Effec-
tive Supervisory Procedures: The Need for Resources, in FUTURe oF Un, supra note 10, 
at 461–65 (proposing, among other things, new sources of support, long range strategy 
for resource development, and dedicated UN budget for treaty monitoring bodies).
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environmental rules and standards and the provision of financial resources 
to ensure their implementation all go hand in hand.131 
Thus, development of a financial mechanism, which might have taken 
the form of a voluntary fund, was put forward as a way to help foster tech-
nical assistance geared toward treaty implementation.132 The language in 
Article 32 ensuring that development programming is made inclusive clearly 
contemplates appropriate resource allocation, such as building accessible 
schools and medical clinics, ensuring that persons with disabilities are 
included in HIV/AIDS and other health programming, and engaging DPOs 
in election processes, to name just a few obvious examples. Unfortunately, 
the opportunity of jump-starting implementation particularly in developing 
countries with seed or pilot funding was missed and it remains the case that 
some developing countries are wary of ratification (and additional human 
rights implementation), absent some measure of resource allocation. 
IV. THE CRPD CONFERENCE OF STATES PARTIES AND CRPD 
COMMITTEE AS AGENTS OF UNITED NATIONS REFORM 
Ultimately, the CRPD Committee together with the Conference of States Parties 
has the ability, within the context of their respective existing authority and 
mandates, to establish good practices that can inform broader human rights 
reform efforts within the United Nations.133 The discussion that follows brings 
to the fore some illustrative innovations that may help to ensure effective 
131. See Monitoring Symposium Report, supra note 8, at 6, 14. Many funds have been 
established, most often within the framework of international environmental conven-
tions, to further environmental protection goals, most typically on a voluntary basis. For 
example, the Global Environmental Facility, established in 1991 by the World Bank, the 
UN Environmental Programme, and the UN Development Programme, provides funds to 
help developing countries meet incremental costs of environmental protection measures 
relating to climate change, biological diversity, international waters, ozone layer deple-
tion and persistent organic pollutants. It also serves as the financial mechanism for four 
international environmental treaties, and thus helps fund initiatives that assist developing 
countries in meeting the objectives of the conventions. Monitoring Symposium Report, 
supra note 8, at 14. 
132. One inspiration for looking into funding mechanism was the document entitled Possible 
Options for the Establishment of a Financial Mechanism for the Implementation of the 
Rotterdam Convention, which was referenced at one of the expert meetings on moni-
toring and details a number of funding mechanisms within international environmental 
law. See Monitoring Symposium Report, supra note 8, at 14. The study in question is 
UNEP/FAO, Possible Options for the Establishment of a Financial Mechanism for the 
Implementation of the Rotterdam Convention, U.N. Doc. UNEP/FAO/RC/COP.3/13 (18 
July 2006) [hereinafter Financial Mechanisms Study] available at http://www.ciel.org/
Publications/Rotterdam_FinMechStudyII_Secretariat.pdf. 
133. See generally Rosemary Kayess & Phillip French, Out of Darkness into Light? Introduc-
ing the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 8 hUm. RTs. l. Rev. 1 
(2008). 
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CRPD monitoring and implementation. At the same time, it is hoped this 
discourse will pave the way for enhanced human rights treaty monitoring 
and implementation more generally.
A. Invigorating the Conference of States Parties
Increasingly in international law domains, treaties provide for periodic Confer-
ence of States Parties for the purpose of assessing strengths and weakness in 
implementation, sharing information and data, and facilitating coordination 
and dialogue among all stakeholders, including NGOs.134 Depending on 
how states parties choose to make Article 40 of the CRPD operational, the 
Conference of States Parties could well serve a function similar to established 
practice in the arms control and particularly international environmental law 
processes by achieving consensus on substantive issues.135 The Department 
for Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), as the co-Secretariat for the Con-
vention, is tasked with servicing the Conferences of States Parties. Thus, the 
extent that Conferences of States Parties can promote policies and practices 
will rely heavily on the efficacy of DESA’s management of those meetings. 
The OHCHR referred to the Mine Ban Treaty Meetings of states parties “as a 
forum to discuss issues, such as critical legal definitions, as well as develop 
further norms and quantitative goals and targets.”136 Because of this success, 
the OHCHR chose to highlight this institutional structure for consideration 
by CRPD drafters as a “global policy making mechanism.”137 
Moreover, the Conference of States Parties could draw upon lessons in 
the environmental realm and use its convening power to stimulate resource 
allocation to implementation. Significantly, the autonomous institutional 
arrangements found in international environmental agreements—including 
conferences or meetings of states parties as well as subsidiary bodies—have 
played important roles in helping to develop the normative content of the 
regimes established under the treaty. They likewise have helped facilitate 
implementation, often through cooperative and facilitative mechanisms, as 
opposed to adversarial methods.138 Such a dynamic might help avoid con-
flicts that might otherwise arise, for example, from differing views between 
developed and developing states as to the extent of resource allocation. 
A salient, albeit modest, example from which to draw is the Quick Start 
Programme initiated by the International Conference on Chemicals Man-
134. See, e.g., Mine Ban Treaty, supra note 69, art. 11. 
135. See infra Part IV, Section J(1), “Central Clearing House/Unifier of Data Collection.”
136. OHCHR Expert Paper, supra note 12, ¶ 65.
137. Id.
138. See Churchill & Ulfstein, supra note 122, at 623, 645.
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agement to implement the Strategic Approach to International Chemicals 
Management (SAICM).139 Quick Start was intended to provide seed money 
in support of initial capacity-building and implementation activities in de-
veloping countries and, while it is time-limited and its funds are modest, 
there is scope for developing countries to access assistance that can further 
implementation of their chemical management obligations.140 Moreover, 
the SAICM encourages developing countries to integrate SAICM objectives 
into their requests for development assistance and indicates that technical 
support to help them do this will be provided if needed.141 Absent politics, 
there is nothing precluding the Conference of States Parties from establishing 
a similar initiative with the CRPD.
b. Introducing a Regional Dimension to CRPD Monitoring and 
Implementation 
While in the end drafters implicitly accepted the argument that the global 
scrutiny offered by an international treaty body was preferable to regional 
monitoring, it may benefit the new CRPD Committee and the OHCHR in 
its Secretariat role to support regional engagement of the type now prac-
ticed in relation to the implementation of Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, which liaises with UNICEF and other entities to achieve progress on 
the ground.142 The Bangkok CRPD draft proposal implicitly acknowledges 
the potential role that the regions could play in implementation, through 
a procedure whereby the treaty body would meet periodically within the 
regions, under the auspices or umbrella of existing regional commissions.143 
One currently discussed proposal is a Disability Rights Tribunal for Asia and 
Pacific that would provide regional data, as well as interpretive guidance 
on cultural implications of the CRPD.144 
139. For a brief overview, see Financial Mechanisms Study, supra note 132, ¶ 110.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See, e.g., LSN Ideas Memorandum on Implementation in Relation to the Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (July 2004) (on file with authors). 
143. See Bangkok Proposal, supra note 9, art. 40(4) (“The meetings of the Committee shall 
be held at United Nations Headquarters and on a rotational basis at the offices of the 
regional commissions of the United Nations.”)
144. Notable in this respect would be the role of family in facilitated decision making. The 
effort is sponsored by the Nippon Foundation, and one of the authors is consulting on 
the development of this body. 
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C. Treaty Committee Experts
The review of existing treaty bodies within the United Nations human rights 
system reveals differential levels of expertise and independence among 
Committee members. Moreover, some members’ heavy workloads outside of 
their Committee responsibilities result in disparate degrees of productivity. In 
addition, the existing treaty bodies disclose an inadequate representational 
diversity, leading some proponents of treaty body reform to advocate in fa-
vor of a “global search process” overseen by the OHCHR to help establish 
diversity criteria and help identify suitable candidates.145 
The drafters of the CRPD did not take suggestions for an enhanced vet-
ting process nor the idea put forward by the OHCHR for the inclusion of 
a review procedure within the states parties nomination process to ensure 
sufficient expertise and qualifications.146 It is hoped that such a process 
could yet be developed, perhaps pursuant to a decision of a Conference of 
States Parties.147 It is likewise hoped that the Committee will be comprised 
principally of experts with disabilities, all of whom have relevant experience 
and expertise in human rights and disability law and policy.
D. NGO Participation in CRPD Monitoring and Implementation
Drafters clearly contemplated an active role for NGOs in the work of the 
Committee, which is consonant with the role that NGOs—and DPOs in 
particular—played in the drafting of the CRPD. Article 38 authorizes the 
Committee to invite “other competent bodies as it may consider appropriate 
to provide expert advice on the implementation of the Convention in areas 
falling within the scope of their activities.”148 This mandate, inter alia, enables 
the Committee to receive and consider information and advice submitted 
by civil society organizations in various formats, including written submis-
sions (such as shadow reports) and oral interventions.149 Experience has 
145. Craig Scott, Bodies of Knowledge: A Diversity Promotion Role for the UN High Com-
missioner for Human Rights, in FUTURe oF Un, supra note 10, at 403, 423.
146. See OHCHR Expert Paper, supra note 12, ¶ 19.
147. See id. Likewise, the language in CRPD does not reflect the very specific articulation 
of necessary qualifications provided in the OPCAT. See OPCAT, supra note 16, art. 5(4) 
(referencing the need for “proven professional experience in the administration of jus-
tice, in particular criminal law, police or prison administration, or in the various fields 
relevant to the treatment of persons deprived of their liberty”).
148. Supra note 16, art. 38(a). 
149. As the OHCHR points out in its Expert Paper prepared for the drafters of the CRPD, the 
CRC Committee has a particularly well-developed practice of encouraging the receipt 
of NGO materials and otherwise facilitating active and highly constructive engagement 
by NGOs in its work. OHCHR Expert Paper, supra note 12, at ¶ 27. 
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demonstrated that NGO participation is paramount in ensuring that treaty 
bodies receive useful and credible information as a means of facilitating 
human rights implementation.150 Trenchantly, communications on behalf of 
aggrieved individuals (including collective/systemic ones) may be submitted 
to the Committee. Individuals may also directly submit their complaints. 
This reporting system increases the prospect of civil society’s participation 
in rights monitoring.151
E. International Cooperation
Article 32 of the CRPD makes it clear that all international cooperation ef-
forts, including international development programs, should be accessible 
and fully inclusive of persons with disabilities.152 Specifically, all states 
parties are required to completely integrate persons with disabilities in all 
aspects of their aid programs—from design through implementation and 
evaluation. As characterized by one leading commentator, “States Parties 
have a duty to proof their development aid programmes from the perspec-
tive of the rights contained in the Convention.”153 The Committee can make 
this essential requirement operational by questioning states on the measures 
they have undertaken to ensure that international development programs 
(whether donor or recipient) are inclusive of persons with disabilities. While 
the Convention provides no specific guidance on the extent to which it cor-
responds to the principles and values of other international instruments and 
processes of development or for making this requirement operational, the 
Conference of States Parties would be an ideal vehicle for following up on 
this requirement, as well as a forum for sharing best practices in inclusive 
development in various sectors.154
150. The Expert Paper prepared by the OHCHR to assist the drafters of the CRPD in developing 
text on monitoring stated: “[a]s an overarching principle, such a monitoring mechanism 
must provide full participation for persons with disabilities, both in terms of access 
and participation in the monitoring process, including with respect to meeting venues, 
documentation and interpretation.” Id. ¶ 10.
151. Cf. ICCPR Optional Protocol, supra note 16, art. 1. It should be noted in this respect 
that the Human Right Committee, in its Rules of Procedure, nonetheless adopted the 
practice of hearing communications on behalf of alleged victims. The CRPD, however, 
follows CERD and the Optional Protocol to CEDAW in conferring standing beyond 
individual complainants. See CERD, supra note 16, art. 14(1); Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, adopted 6 
Oct. 1999, G.A. Res.54/4, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/4 (1999). 
2131 U.N.T.S. 83 (entered into force 22 Dec. 2000). 
152. CRPD Optional Protocol, supra note 2, art. 32.
153. Quinn, Resisting the ‘Temptation of Elegance’, supra note 13, at 254.
154. This has proved a useful practice of the Mine Ban Treaty implementation process in which 
regular meetings of states parties have provided an important forum for the reporting on 
and sharing of best practices in Mine Ban Treaty implementation, including, for example, 
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F. Forging Linkages with Other bodies
The work of the United Nations system on the advancement of the rights of 
persons with disabilities extends well beyond the CRPD and its attendant 
monitoring mechanisms. Disability is a cross-cutting issue that should be 
part and parcel of the work of all United Nations programs. Moreover, there 
are a number of international, as well as regional, intergovernmental bod-
ies that have some form of responsibility in the issue areas covered by the 
CRPD, several of which have monitoring responsibilities relating to disability 
rights.155 While the CRPD does contain a provision in Article 38 regarding the 
relationships of the Committee to other bodies, the type of detailed guidance 
envisaged by the OHCHR156 was not included. In choosing to chart out its 
relationship with other UN bodies and mechanisms, the Committee could 
help achieve the broad vision of the CRPD toward greater inclusion of the 
human rights of persons with disabilities in law, policy and programming. 
Likewise, the Committee can break new ground in realizing the prom-
ise of engagement with NHRIs whose contemplated role in national level 
monitoring can and should be reinforced through the Committee’s efforts. 
This is so especially in view of the important progress already being done 
within the International Coordinating Committee of NHRIs around CRPD 
implementation.157 The Committee could draw from the experience of the 
CRC Committee and articulate guidelines for the participation of partners 
in its work in a proactive effort to promote engagement that is meaningful 
and substantive.158
G. Proactive Inquiries
CRPD’s Optional Protocol includes a procedure of inquiry159 similar to 
that of some human rights monitoring systems, which allows human 
   expenditures on victim assistance programming and the like. For more on Mine Ban 
Treaty implementation and meetings of states parties, see the International Campaign to 
Ban Landmines website, available at http://www.icbl.org/index.php/icbl/Treaties/MBT/
ISC and http://www.icbl.org/index.php/icbl/Treaties/MBT/Annual-Meetings.
155. Thus, for example, the U.N. Mine Action Service has, as one of its pillars, victim as-
sistance. See Susan Fiederlein, Victim Assistance: A Way Forward Emerges, Journal of 
Mine Action (Dec. 2002), available at http://maic.jmu.edu/Journal/6.3/focus/fiederlein/
fiederlein.htm (discussing victim assistance as a pillar of UNMAS programming).
156. See OHCHR Expert Paper, supra note 12, ¶ 64.
157. For more on this work, see Harvard Law School Project on Disability, available at http://
www.hpod.org.
158. See CRC Guidelines for the Participation of Partners (NGOs and Independent Experts) in 
the Pre-Sessional Working Group of the Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, U.N. GAOR, 
Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, 22d Sess., at 111, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/90 (1999), avail-
able at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/crc/docs/guidelines-E.pdf.
159. See CRPD Optional Protocol, supra note 2, art. 6.
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rights monitoring systems to initiate investigations regarding egregious or 
systematic human rights violations.160 In such cases, the Committee shall 
call on that state party to collaborate in an investigation and submit its 
observations161 for review.162 The CRPD includes in its Optional Protocol 
a procedure of inquiry,163 employed within some human rights monitoring 
systems, to allow human rights monitoring systems to initiate investigations, 
particularly regarding egregious or systematic human rights violations.164 A 
procedure of inquiry is triggered in cases where the Committee receives 
“reliable” information relating to “grave or systematic violations by a State 
Party of rights set forth in the Convention.”165 One might well imagine, for 
example, an inquiry concerning the institutionalization of persons with dis-
abilities or the systematic exclusion of disabled children from schools. In 
such cases, the Committee shall call on that state party to collaborate in an 
investigation of the situation and submit its observations.166 Thereafter, the 
Committee reviews the information submitted by the state party and other 
reliable information submitted by other parties.167 
The Committee may choose to authorize one or more of its members 
to conduct an inquiry and report “urgently” to the Committee.168 Such an 
inquiry may include a visit to the territory of the state party subject to con-
sent of the state party (consent being a standard principle of international 
legal process). The findings of any such inquiry are sent to the state party, 
along with Committee “comments and recommendations.” 169 The state party 
is given an opportunity to respond within six months.170 The procedure is 
confidential; accordingly, the proceedings are entirely closed and the written 
findings are not made public.171 The Committee may solicit the state party 
after six months to appraise it of what measures it assumed in reply to the 
inquiry,172 and may invite the state party to include details of these measures 
in its habitual CRPD report.173
160. See, e.g., CAT, supra note 16, art. 20.
161. See CRPD Optional Protocol, supra note 2, art. 6(1).
162. See id. art. 6(2).
163. Id. art. 6.
164. See, e.g., CAT, supra note 16, art. 20; see also the Charter-based 103 communications 
procedure, now administered under the Human Rights Council pursuant to U.N. Hu-
man Rights Council: Institution Building, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/5/L.2/Annex (18 June 2007) 
available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/chr/complaints.htm.
165. CAT, supra note 16, art. 6.
166. Id. art. 6(1).
167. Id. art. 6(2).
168. Id. 
169. Id. art. 6(3).
170. Id. art. 6(4).
171. Id. art. 6(5).
172. Id. art. 7(2).
173. Id. art. 7(1); CRPD, supra note 1, art. 35.
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Such follow-up procedures in relation to communications or inquiry 
mechanisms enhance compliance with recommendations and other mea-
sures. Whether the Committee will proactively engage in such follow-up will 
depend upon the resources at its disposal, as well as the manner in which 
it perceives its mandate. It must be underscored, however, that the efficacy 
of any procedural innovations related to reporting will be determined by 
the extent that the Committee follows up on these measures. For example, 
the Committee could assign one or more members specifically to follow up 
with states; the elicited information would then be made publically available 
for use by civil society and other monitoring agents. 
H. CRPD Secretariat, Department of Economic & Social Affairs, and the 
UN Special Rapporteur on Disability
DESA is and will continue to be responsible for the oversight of the imple-
mentation of the World Programme of Action Concerning Disabled Persons174 
and the UN Standard Rules,175 as well as other disability-related standards 
and guidelines through its CRPD Secretariat. DESA will also serve as the 
Secretariat for the Conference of States Parties pursuant to Article 40 of the 
Convention.176 Additionally, DESA services the Special Rapporteur on Dis-
ability, which was established by and reports to the Commission on Social 
Development, outside the framework of the UN human rights system. The 
Office of Special Rapporteur position is separate from the special rappor-
teurs and other special procedures falling under the Human Rights Council 
and serviced by the OHCHR.177 It will be essential for DESA to facilitate 
the engagement of the Special Rapporteur in the work of the Committee on 
Disability and indeed other human rights mechanisms. Likewise, DESA must 
174. World Programme of Action Concerning Disabled Persons, adopted 3 Dec. 1982, G.A. 
Res. 37/52, U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 51, 37th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/37/51 (1982), available 
at http://www.icrpd.net/implementation/en/toolkit/files/World%20Programme%20of%20
Action.htm.
175. See The Standard Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities, 
adopted 20 Dec. 1993, 85th Plenary Meeting, ¶ 1, Part IV, A/Res/48/96, available at 
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/dissre00.htm.
176. See CRPD, supra note 1, art. 40(1).
177. The Special Rapporteur on Disability is endowed with responsibility to consult with a 
panel of experts established pursuant to the UN Standard Rules and present states with 
questions concerning their implementation of the Standard Rules. There are a number 
of disadvantages in having the Special Rapporteur on Disability fall outside the Human 
Rights Council’s purview, including non-participation in the coordinating structure of 
the special procedures and the limited opportunities to draw from the experience of 
the other special procedures to facilitate their work on disability issues. For more on 
the special procedures (such as special rapporteurs and thematic mechanisms), see 
the OHCHR website at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRbodies/Pages/HumanRightsBodies.
aspx.
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be proactive in ensuring that the Conference of States Parties is a meaningful 
forum within which to promote communication and interaction between 
the Special Rapporteur, the Committee, and other parties, including states, 
UN agencies, NHRIs and NGOs. 
It is not clear whether the appointment of the Special Rapporteur on 
Disability will continue to be renewed indefinitely now that the CRPD is 
in place and operational. Nonetheless, assuming the future existence of 
the office and drawing from the experience of special rapporteurs created 
within the framework of the United Nations human rights system and 
serviced by the OHCHR, there are ways in which the Special Rapporteur 
on Disability could relate to the new convention implementation structure 
(and the United Nations human rights system more generally) and use the 
office to ensure that existing instruments on disability are understood and 
operationalized consistent with the CRPD.178 It should be noted, however, 
that proposals to make the Special Rapporteur on Disability an ex officio 
member of the Committee received little support during the course of the 
negotiations and no specific reference was made to the Special Rapporteur 
in the final convention text.179 Although this may not be a bad omission, 
issues relating to overlap and coordination—not to mention the continued 
existence of the Special Rapporteur on Disability and the role of the Human 
Rights Committee in appointment of such individuals—must be addressed 
in future. The proposal by the OHCHR for a provision providing detailed 
guidance on the relationship between the different mechanisms, such as 
the thematic procedures,180 was not taken up. Likewise, the proposal by 
the OHCHR for a specific provision to address the relationship between the 
Committee and the Special Rapporteur on Disability went unaddressed.181 
However, the Committee, working together with the OHCHR and DESA, 
could address this gap. 
I. General Principles and the Animation of Monitoring and 
Implementation 
The CRPD stands out among core international human rights conventions 
in its articulation of general principles, which are set forth in a separate ar-
ticle.182 Although the explicit articulation of general principles is a common 
178. Cf. Aaron A. Dhir, Human Rights Treaty Drafting Through the Lens of Mental Disabil-
ity: The Proposed International Convention on Protection and Promotion of the Rights 
and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, 41 sTan. J. inT’l. l. 181 (2005) (discussing the 
prospects of having a disability Ombudsman). 
179. See Compilation of Proposals, supra note 74, art. 28(5).
180. See OHCHR Expert Paper, supra note 12, ¶ 64.
181. Id. ¶ 24.
182. CRPD, supra note 1, art. 3.
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feature of international environmental agreements183 and other framework 
conventions,184 human rights conventions have not contained specific pro-
visions outlining general principles. At best, treaty bodies have identified 
such principles, as in the case of the CRC.185 The Committee will need to 
explicate the application of the general principles across the treaty text for 
states parties, including in the realm of monitoring and implementation. This 
may be accomplished not only through the review of states parties reports, 
but likewise in the formulation of general comments on the treaty text.186 
Thus, in keeping with the suggestions put forward in the context of draft-
ing the CRPD monitoring mechanism, the Committee will need to ensure 
that, “[a]s an overarching principle . . . [the] monitoring mechanism must 
provide full participation for persons with disabilities, both in terms of ac-
cess and participation in the monitoring process, including with respect to 
meeting venues, documentation and interpretation.”187 The initial meeting of 
the Committee on Disability suggests that states parties are indeed looking 
for guidance on the interpretation of the text and other types of assistance 
related to the explication of their obligations.188 Ultimately, the efficacy of 
these proposals will depend on the Experts themselves, and the extent to 
which they commit to proactive roles. 
J. Process and Working Methods 
In relation to its process and working methods, the Committee may wish 
to emulate best practices from existing treaty bodies, as well as incorporate 
suggested reforms.189 For example, one commentator has advocated increas-
183. See, e.g., United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, adopted 9 May 
1992, (entered into force 24 Mar. 1994), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992), art. 4(1)(i), 
available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf.
184. See, e.g., WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, available at http://whqlib-
doc.who.int/publications/2003/9241591013.pdf.
185. The Committee on the Rights of the Child has opined that states are obliged to implement 
CRC obligations within the context of its basic principles which include the principle of 
non-discrimination, best interests of the child, the right to life, maximum survival and 
development, and participation. General Measures of Implementation of the Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 5 ¶ 12, U.N. GAOR, Comm. 
on Rts. of the Child, 34th Sess., U.N. Doc. CRC/GC/2003/5 (2003), available at http://
www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/898586b1dc7b4043c1256a450044f331/3bba808e47bf25a
8c1256db400308b9e/$FILE/G0345514.doc.
186. The general comments of the human rights treaty bodies and other work product may 
be accessed through the OHCHR website, as well as the Netherlands Institute of Human 
Rights web page, available at http://sim.law.uu.nl/sim/Dochome.nsf. 
187. OHCHR Expert Paper, supra note 12, ¶ 10.
188. For a review of these initial discussions of the Committee on Disability, see CRPD, 1st 
Sess. Ad Hoc Comm.(2009), available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRPD/
Pages/Session1.aspx. 
189. The OHCHR Expert Paper is perhaps the most detailed work disclosing how specific 
processes and working methods could best be adopted for the new CRPD Committee
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ing the efficiency of the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination body by adopting procedural rules that allow 
the Chair to solely congratulate states representatives for their participation, 
mandate convening sessions on time,190 delegate work in advance of formal 
sessions, and limit non-pertinent interventions by members.191 Such propos-
als, formulated in the context of treaty body practice, should make their way 
into the development of the Committee working methods as appropriate. 
These ostensibly mundane matters assume significance when one considers 
the daunting time constraints of human rights treaty bodies. The following 
five sub-sections set forth procedural powers of the Committee and flexible 
adaptations of working methods to advance CRPD implementation.
1. Working Methods to Focus on Thematic Issues
Other potential measures for enhancing the Committee’s productivity 
through procedural rules might include authorizing the creation of subsidiary 
bodies such as working, thematic, and technical advisory sub-groups. Within 
the context of the Committee’s work, it might be useful to commission sub-
groups on specialized issues such as legal capacity or election access for 
persons with disabilities and to have these entities supported in their tasks 
by bodies authorized under the CRPD.192 These working methods may be 
particularly important given the traditional dearth of meeting time allocated 
for these bodies to conduct their work. 
   in the light of lessons learned and current treaty body practice. See generally OHCHR 
Expert Paper, supra note 12. 
190. Karl Josef Partsch, The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, in UniTed 
naTions and hUman RighTs 339, 365–66 (Philip Alston ed., 1992). 
191. Id. at 366.
192. CRPD, supra note 1, art. 38. The tasking of technical bodies with advisory responsi-
bilities is a common and helpful practice within other international treaty domains. 
International environmental agreements routinely establish standing committees or sci-
entific councils mandated to provide recommendations on technical matters, necessary 
research, coordination of research, evaluation of results, and other specialized matters 
bearing upon the implementation of the treaty. See, e.g., United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, adopted 9 May 1992, art. 9, (entered into force 24 Mar. 
1994), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992), available at http://unfccc.int/not_assigned/b/
items/1417.php; Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, 
adopted 20 May 1980, art. XV, (entered into force 7 Apr. 1982), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 
849 (1980), available at http://www.ccamlr.org/pu/E/quick_links.htm; Convention on the 
Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats, adopted 19 Sept. 1979, art. 
14, (entered into force 1 June 1982), reprinted in U.K.T.S. 56 (1982), available at http://
conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/104.htm; Convention on the Conservation 
of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, adopted 23 June 1979, art.VIII, (entered into 
force 1 Nov. 1983), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 15 (1980), available at http://www.cms.int/
pdf/convtxt/cms_convtxt_english.pdf. 
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2. Reporting Guidelines/Targeted Lists of Questions for Consideration
The role of the Committee in articulating reporting guidelines is a particularly 
important one and the Committee should take up the challenge to follow the 
best practices of existing treaty bodies in formulating its guidelines.193 For 
example, the Committee on the Rights of the Child has specified reporting 
guidelines that are well-tailored to the specific obligations set forth in the 
CRC.194 While the drafters did not take up the suggestion of the OHCHR 
to write into the text the authorization of the Committee to create lists of 
questions or issues specifically for a state party in the context of its report-
ing obligation,195 the Committee has ample discretion to do so. Thus, for 
example, where a state is due for reporting and has specific widespread 
practices ostensibly at odds with the CRPD, such as congregate institu-
tionalization or far-reaching guardianship laws stripping persons with dis-
abilities of legal capacity, these issues could be brought to the attention of 
the reporting state party who could then come prepared to address these 
matters in substantive detail.
3. Late Reporting
In the event a report is “significantly overdue,” the Committee may give the 
state party in question a three-month notice to submit a report in conjunction 
with its CRPD implementation.196 This past due provision is a novel advance 
but does reflect an established, albeit relatively rare, practice among treaty 
monitoring bodies to review implementation in the absence of a report. This 
provision has the potential to facilitate and expedite state reporting account-
ability.197 It is thus within the discretion of the Committee to take a more 
proactive role in addressing delinquency in reporting by states parties. In 
such cases, the Committee could invite NHRIs and NGOs to help fill in the 
reporting gap and provide these actors with the ability to appear before the 
Committee and participate in a dialogue regarding country conditions in the 
relevant non-reporting state. Taking this measure could create an incentive 
for state compliance in the absence of other enforcement mechanisms. 
193. Guidelines on reporting “are designed to ensure that reports are presented in a uni-
form manner so that [the treaty body] can obtain a complete picture of the situation of 
implementation.” OHCHR Expert Paper, supra note 12, ¶ 33. For a thorough account 
of reporting under existing bodies and suggestions directly pertaining to the formulation 
of reporting procedures under the CRPD, see OHCHR Expert Paper, supra note 12, ¶¶ 
22–42.
194. See General Guidelines Regarding the Form and Contents of Periodic Reports To Be 
Submitted by States Parties, adopted 20 Nov. 1996, Comm. on Rts. of the Child, U.N. 
GAOR, 13th Sess., 343d mtg., U.N. Doc. CRC/C/58 (1996)), available at http://www.
unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/CRC.C.58.En?Opendocument.
195. See OHCHR Expert Paper, supra note 12, ¶ 38.
196. See CRPD, supra note 1, art. 36(2).
197. For discussion of this practice, see OHCHR Expert Paper, supra note 12, ¶ 35. 
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4. Communications
The Committee may, at any time after receiving a communication, but 
before determining its merits, request that a state party adopt sufficient 
interim measures “to avoid possible irreparable damage” to the alleged 
victims of its actions.198 However, such action does not imply the ultimate 
admissibility or merits of the given communication.199 The possibility of such 
precautionary measures is important and has been clearly demonstrated in 
a petition concerning the rights of persons with mental disabilities before 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of 
American States.200 That case also illustrated the proactive role that can be 
played by certain monitoring bodies, with the Commission converting an 
original individual complaint to one that encompassed all individuals insti-
tutionalized in the state facility.201 
Given that the Committee is authorized to hear group complaints202 
(as well as to make inquiries regarding systemic CRPD violations), 203 it 
would follow that similar action would fall within its purview.204 In addi-
tion, although the Ad Hoc Committee did not take up the suggestion of the 
OHCHR for a specific provision allowing the Committee to address urgent 
situations through early warning measures, it would be within the mandate 
of the Committee to do so.205
198. See CRPD, supra note 1, art. 4(1).
199. See id. art. 4(2). 
200. In December 2003, in a landmark decision on a petition, the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights approved a petition for precautionary measures to protect the lives 
and physical integrity of people detained in a psychiatric institution in Paraguay and 
requested that the Government of Paraguay adopt all necessary measures to protect the 
lives, health, and the physical, mental and moral integrity of the 460 people detained 
in the institution, with special attention to the situation of women and children. See 
Precautionary Measures Granted or Extended by the Commission During 2003: Paraguay, 
on Behalf of the Patients of the Hospital Neurosiquiátrico (Neuro-psychiatric Hospital), 
in annUal RepoRT oF The inTeR-ameRiCan Commission on hUman RighTs 2003, OEA/Ser./L/V/
II.118, doc. 25., rev. 2 (2001), ch. III.C, ¶ 60. For more on this petition, see the timeline 
and discussion of this petition on the Mental Disability Rights International website, 
available at http://www.mdri.org/projects/americas/paraguay/index.htm.
201. Id.
202. CRPD Optional Protocol, supra note 2, art. 1(1).
203. Id. art. 6(1).
204. For example, in International Association Autism – Europe (IAAE) v. France, No. 13/2002, 
3.CoE.12 (10 Mar. 2004), the European Committee on Social Rights engaged in a far-
reaching investigation of the extent to which children with autism were mainstreamed 
into France’s school system. 
205. See, e.g., OHCHR Expert Paper, supra note 12, ¶ 55. CERD developed early warn-
ing and urgent action measures in 1993, which may be invoked by the Committee or 
interested parties. See Working Paper on Prevention of Racial Discrimination, Includ-
ing Early Warning and Urgent Procedures, Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Dis-
crimination, A/48/18, annex III, available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/
docs/A_48_18_Annex_III_English.pdf.
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5. Central Clearing House/Unifier of Data Collection
Article 31 of the CRPD requires states parties to “collect appropriate informa-
tion, including statistical and research data” in order to create and implement 
policies that give effect to the Convention.206 The Article also outlines the 
standards to be used for the collection, maintenance and use of this infor-
mation.207 The drafters of the Convention were particularly concerned about 
the dearth of disability-specific statistics and data.208 At the same time, the 
Ad Hoc Committee sought to balance the need to stimulate better practices 
in this context with the need to ensure that the process by which such data 
is collected and ultimately used, does not violate the rights of persons with 
disabilities.209 The resulting text reflects these interests and the equilibrium 
desired. The task of the Committee will be to ensure, within the framework 
of the reporting process, that disability statistics data are collected and ap-
plied in keeping with Article 31. In this regard the Committee might take 
direction from the CRC Committee which references, in the context of its 
reporting guidelines, the need for statistical information as a means of ef-
fective implementation and monitoring.210 
Significantly, there is nothing to preclude the Conference of States Par-
ties from taking on the role that many such institutional mechanisms play 
within the context of environmental or arms control treaties, insofar as they 
provide opportunities for setting benchmarks and quantitative goals and 
targets. In this sense, Conferences of States Parties could be utilized as a 
forum for information exchange based on data and dialogue on progressive 
tools to aid implementation, including, for example, disability rights budget 
analysis. Indeed, in order for the data and statistical vision of the CRPD to 
206. CRPD, supra note 1, art. 31(1). This provision appears to have its origins in the Bangkok 
Proposal, supra note 9, art. 33.
207. CRPD, supra note 1, art. 31(1).
The process of collecting and maintaining this information shall: (a) Comply with legally established 
safeguards, including legislation on data protection, to ensure confidentiality and respect for the 
privacy of persons with disabilities; (b) Comply with internationally accepted norms to protect human 
rights and fundamental freedoms and ethical principles in the collection and use of statistics.. 
208. See, e.g., Working Group Draft, supra note 13, n.23 (noting that the inclusion of an 
article on data and statistics was regarded as important as it “could allow States to re-
spond more effectively to the needs of persons with disabilities and to have an accurate 
assessment of the situation of the persons concerned so as to implement programs for 
their benefit”).
209. Id. art. 6. The initial Working Group text reflects this tension insofar as it focuses heavily, 
to the point of repetition, on issues of privacy, confidentiality and the like in relation 
to disability data collection and use. See also the commentary on Article 6 referencing 
“repetition and redundancies.” Janet E. Lord, Katherine N. Guernsey & Kirsten Young, 
LSN Legal Commentary on the Draft Convention Text produced by the Working Group 
to the Ad Hoc Committee (Mar. 2004) (on file with authors).
210. See Committee on the Rights of the Child, Reporting Guidelines to States Parties, supra 
note 194, ¶ 7.
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be realized, it is clear that the national research and statistical capacities 
must be strengthened and further developed for the development, testing 
and use of Article 31 disability data collection instruments. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities along with the 
CRPD Conference of States Parties has commenced operations at a time 
when the United Nations human rights treaty monitoring system is experi-
encing strong pressure for reform. The established human rights monitoring 
committees are beset by backlogs in the reporting process and face severe 
resource challenges that impact their ability to undertake the depth of analysis 
and engagement with states parties contemplated by their mandates. The 
CRPD’s drafters were well aware of the challenges facing the treaty body 
system that will likewise face this newest committee. Accordingly, the draft-
ers attempted to account for challenges by incorporating innovations in the 
resulting monitoring provisions. 
Yet, for reasons of political expediency coupled with time constraints 
that prevented a more considered negotiation process for the monitoring and 
implementation provisions, those drafters declined to adopt other far reaching 
mechanisms that could have addressed additional systemic flaws. Secretariat 
responsibilities are to be shared between Geneva and New York. Technical 
expertise on human rights and disability issues have been strengthened in 
both the OHCHR as well as DESA with the hiring of additional staff and 
engagement with DPOs and academic institutes committed to working on 
human rights and disability. Experience indicates that a progressive treaty 
body can make much of even minimalist monitoring and implementation 
provisions, and given the relatively broader scope offered by the mecha-
nisms in the CRPD, a proactive Committee coupled with the enlightened 
support of the dual Secretariat structure can be expected to make significant 
progress towards the realization of the Convention’s visionary framework. 
Moreover, the experience of international environmental law, particularly its 
pattern of developing creative institutional arrangements such as conferences 
or meetings of the parties and subsidiary bodies to facilitate cooperative 
implementation and develop the normative content of a treaty over time, 
provides ample lessons for the CRPD regime. 
The CRPD text itself acknowledges the prospect of human rights treaty 
body reform, as reflected in Article 47. The prospect of a unified treaty body 
carries with it particular dangers for CRPD implementation. The Convention 
was negotiated in large part on the basis that the current system had utterly 
failed to address disability rights in any on-going, consistent, and competent 
manner. There is an undeniable tension between calls to adopt a compre-
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hensive and more holistic approach to treaty monitoring and the interest in 
developing expertise and specialization vis-à-vis specific human rights issue 
areas and the protection of groups subjected to egregious discrimination, 
including persons with disabilities as well as other marginalized groups. Any 
proposal that seeks to develop a unified body needs to address this tension 
clearly. Moreover, there would need to be some mechanism, even within a 
unified body, of addressing the specific barriers in relation to accessing hu-
man rights for, among others, women, racial minorities, children, and people 
with disabilities. A new system would need to reflect the principles of non-
discrimination, inclusion, and participation as well as account for diversity 
in a way that ensures meaningful––as opposed to superficial––coverage of 
the rights of all persons.
